From here on out I’ll be throwing up some more player comparisons.  The comparisons are 100% stat/measurables based and 0% scouting based, so feel free to take that into consideration when reading.  One other thing to note is that running backs are going to be heavily reliant on scheme.  We’ll look at them again after the draft.  Also keep in mind that similarity is not equal to destiny.

Today’s comparisons are for Washington running back Chris Polk.

Player	Chris Polk	Ladell Betts	Tashard Choice
Wt	215.0	220.0	215.0
40 Time	4.57	4.62	4.48
Year	2011	2001	2007
School	Washington	Iowa	Georgia Tech
Strength of Schedule	4.0	3.9	2.1
Att/G	22.5	20.8	21.8
Y/G	114.5	105.0	114.9
YPC	5.1	5.0	5.3
TD/G	0.9	1.0	0.8
Rec/G	2.4	1.2	1.2
Rec Y/G	25.5	12.3	8.9
YPR	10.7	10.3	7.6

I’m firmly on record as arguing against selecting Trent Richardson where he is likely to be selected in this year’s draft.  Not because I don’t think he’ll be a stud.  He probably will be (and I would take him in a heartbeat in fantasy football).  My argument is related to the value of running backs and really the value of the running game.

Here are the components to the argument against running backs in the first round:

1. The best case scenario isn’t that good.  Barry Sanders played for the Lions from 1989-98.  The Lions record over that time was 78-82.  Adrian Peterson has played for the Vikings since 2007.  The Vikings record over that time is 39-41.  LaDanian Tomlinson played for the Chargers between 2001 and 2009.  They actually had a winning record during that stretch (unlike Sanders’ Lions and Peterson’s Vikings).  However, their worst record (4-12) over that span came in the year that they averaged the best rushing yards/carry (the Chargers averaged 5.15 YPC in 2003).  Their worst rushing yards/carry came in a year that they were 13-3 as a team (when they averaged 3.33 YPC).
2. The running game is antiquated.  Getting a running back now is like if you would have bought a horse and buggy after the Model T started rolling off the line.  If passing yields more yards than running, you should really only run in order to keep the defense guessing.
3. Running doesn’t cause winning.  Look at the top five quarterbacks in terms of yards/attempt.  Then look at the top five running backs in yards/attempt.  Compare the records of the two groups.  This is a very simple analysis to do, but it will make sense to most people.
4. Draft picks are choices among scarce resources.  If you take a running back, you’re opting not to take a piece that will help you either pass, or defend against the pass.
5. Taking a running back in the first round locks that player in at a higher salary than you would have to spend on a mid or late round running back.  Teams should spend as little as possible on running backs because, again, running doesn’t cause winning.  Every dollar you save on the running game is another dollar that can go to the passing game.
6. Not having a good running back doesn’t mean you can’t have a good running game.  Running backs are just one piece of at least six positions required to run the football.  Any time running backs fail we blame it on the offensive line.  But offensive line picks also are part of the passing game, so if it’s a choice between a running back and a lineman, you should always take the lineman.
7. Teams should draft linemen instead of running backs early and then they should just look for the fastest big running back they can find late.

This all begs the question: When can you select a running back?  To me the answer to that question is about the same as “When can you get 22 inch rims for your car?”  When you have no other problems.

Daniel Kahneman is probably one of the most influential thinkers of our time.  His work has made it into the thinking of people like Nassim Taleb and it causes all sorts of problems for economists because it contradicts the notion of human beings as rational actors.  If you’re interested, Michael Lewis recently profiled Kahneman when his book Thinking, Fast and Slow was published.

I’m interested in Kahneman’s work insofar as he has covered the issue of experts vs. analytics.  A number of studies have been undertaken to answer the question of whether experts can be more accurate than simple algorithms.  This research has implications for the ways that NFL teams conduct their business. 

NFL coaches and player personnel staff are experts of the same sort that Kahneman is interested in and you would have to think they are subject to the same limitations.

From Thinking, Fast and Slow:

Meehl reviewed the results of 20 studies that had analyzed whether clinical predictions based on the subjective impressions of trained professionals were more accurate than statistical predictions made by combining a few scores or ratings according to a rule. In a typical study, trained counselors predicted the grades of freshmen at the end of the school year. The counselors interviewed each student for forty-five minutes. They also had access to high school grades, several aptitude tests, and a four-page personal statement. The statistical algorithm used only a fraction of this information: high school grades and one aptitude test. Nevertheless, the formula was more accurate than 11 of the 14 counselors. Meehl reported generally similar results across a variety of other forecast outcomes, including violations of parole, success in pilot training, and criminal recidivism.

Not surprisingly, Meehl’s book provoked shock and disbelief among clinical psychologists, and the controversy it started has engendered a stream of research that is still flowing today, more than fifty years after its publication. The number of studies reporting comparisons of clinical and statistical predictions has increased to roughly two hundred, but the score in the contest between algorithms and humans has not changed. About 60% of the studies have shown significantly better accuracy for the algorithms. The other comparisons scored a draw in accuracy, but a tie is tantamount to a win for the statistical rules, which are normally much less expensive to use than expert judgment. No exception has been convincingly documented.

Kahneman, Daniel (2011-10-25). Thinking, Fast and Slow (pp. 222-223). Macmillan. Kindle Edition.